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CJIURCIIBS IN EASTERN EUROPE: TBREB MODELS OF CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS 
AND THEIR RELEVANCE FOR THE EC1JMENICAL MOVEMENT 
by J. A. Beb1y 
Dr. J. A. (Hans) Hebly (Dutch Reformed) was 
born in 1923 and received his doctorate in 
theology from Utrecht University. From 1951 to 
1970 he served as a minister in the Netherlands 
Reformed Church. Since 1970 he has been the 
deputy director of the Interacademical Insti­
tute for Missiological and Ecumenical Research, 
Utrecht, the Netherlands. He is t he author of 
Protestants in Russia (1976), Churches in 
Eastern Europe (1975 in Dutch) , The Russians 
and the World Council of Churches (1978), 
Churches Within Socialism (1979 in Dutch about 
the G. D. R. )  The Struggle for Peace (1983 in 
Dutch), and The New Confession of Faith of the 
Evangelical Christian Baptists (1983 in Dutch) . 
It is not so easy to define exactly what we mean when we speak of 
"Eastern Europe. Geographically the notion is rather unclear; the GDR 
and Hungary, for instance, do not consider themselves belonging to 
Eastern Europe in this sense. Confessionally we speak of the Eastern 
and Western churches, meaning Latin and Orthodox Christianity, and in 
this sense Poland belongs to the West. For present purposes let us 
speak of Eastern Europe in the popular political sense; namely, that 
part of a continent which has a communist system of government and 
"" 
belongs to the Soviet sphere of influence. In that sense Yugoslavia is 
not really part of Eastern Europe. 
It is also a very complicated matter to speak in general about 
"the" churches in Eastern Europe. Every church has its own hi story and 
background. There are those which have been up until modern times 
powerful, .privileged people' s-churches and which have gone through a 
difficult process of adaptation to a totally new situation. Then, there 
are small minority churches, often oppressed in the past, which were at 
first inclined to accept a new communist regime as sort of liberation 
from age-long oppression by ruling confessions. There are Orthodox, 
Ran an catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed churches that have reacted in 
their own, very different ways to the situation that arose after the 
communists had taken over. The relations of church and state and church 
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and society were and are no� identical, and the fact that the communist 
regime was established in the Soviet Union in 1917 and in the other 
countries only after 1945 is not without significance. The communists 
initially tried to apply the Soviet mother-model of church-state 
relations in the other countries, but that has in some cases been a 
complete failure, most clearly in the GDR and in Poland. It is for that 
reason impossible to speak in general terms about the church in 
socialism, or the church in Eastern Europe. One should always be more 
specific in defining historical and confes sional contexts. 
Another important factor which should be kept in mind is that 
there has been a process of developnent in church-state relations in 
the last 30 years. It no longer suffices to speak of a general policy 
of persecution and oppression of the church. There have been changes in 
the policy or tactics of the regimes. They have learned to live with 
the fact that Christian churches continue to exist and that they will 
do so for a considerable time. In the ideal communist society, belief 
in God and the church will have died, but this s tage has not yet been 
reached and, as some communists say, the disappearance of religion is 
not a condition for, but will be a consequence of, the establishment of 
a communist society. 
The present stage, that of "developed real" socialism, is no 
1onger regarded solely as a transitory period, a sort of purgatory 
before entering paradise. The myth of progress has fallen into the 
background. Communism, as Wolfgang Buscher writes, is not so much 
political action directed toward conquering and establishing political 
power, 
but a form of the existing society aimed at 
stabilization--it is establishment. In spite 
of all present polemics against the thesis of 
Ulbricht of socialism as a relatively inde­
pendent form of society between capital ism 
and communism, this thesis is the hidden 
ideological basis of present party policies. 
An inspiring concept of progress and a model 
of the future which can mobilize the workers 
and the intellectuals are wanting in GDR 
socialism. It is more a question 1 of the st abilization of existing conditions. 
- 15 -
The party wants the churches as supporting partners; the ideology 
has not succeeded in really inspiring the people, and the party looks 
for those elements which can help buld up a new national identity. The 
celebration of the Luther Year in the GDR is a good example. The regime 
has come to the conclusion that there should be a constructive 
"miteinander von Staat und Kirche" [a togetherness of state and 
church]. The Hungarian Reformed Bishop Karoly Toth says that the 
Marxists themselves discover that improvement of social conditions does 
not automatically create the new person, but rather emphasizes the 
problems of individual life. Because of this he sees new dimensions for 
.the pastorate of the church in present-day Hungarian society.
2 
Because of the endeavors to bring in the churches as associates 
for the building up of the real socialist society, anti-church policies 
and ag gressive atheist propaganda have been abandoned in the GDR and 
Hungary. Fundamentally, a similar tendency can be observed at work in 
the Soviet Union. The existence of the church is more or less accepted 
or tolerated and the fight against religion is in some publications 
presented as a fight against those social roots from which religion 
arises. If the social causes of religious consciousness are eliminated, 
then this changes one into a tree without roots, which withers away and 
perishes.
3 
In the Soviet Union, however, there is a distinct tendency 
to encourage this process of decay and there is active propaganda for 
atheism. It is said in an article in Pravda: 
Since the establishment of a new social order 
the tendency toward the decay of religion in 
the USSR is strengthening. It would be a 
mistake, however, to assume that religious 
faith can fully disappear on its own, only 
through the influence of the socialist way of 
life and the achievements of technical­
scientific progress, (or) without the 
development 4of systematic, efficient athe­istic work." 
This should not, however, have only the form of enlightenment, but be 
direc ted towards the activation of the participation of believers in the 
society in the existing social, political, and cultural organizations.· 
V. Kuroyedov wrote in Kommunist: "The involvement of believers in the 
practical struggle of the building up of socialism and communism, and at 
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the same time the constant propaganda for the ma terialis tic world -view 
among the masses , is the scientifically correct way to overcome 
religious prejudices."5 
A description follows of the church -sta te situation in three 
socialist countries: the Orthodox Church in the USSR , and the Pro testant 
churches in Hungary and in the GDR --three different models . The Russian 
Orthodox Church (ROC ) is above all a priestly church, which seeks 
solidarity wi th people and na tion , stresses the liturgical -sacramental 
life, and does not deal with social and poli tical issues on its own 
impulse but only where the government expec ts it . �l'his is the case 
es pecially in peace work . The ROC ado pts a patrio tic, no t an 
ideological , posi tion . The leaders of the Hungarian Pro tes tant churches 
iden tified themselves with the ruling regime and accepted the place 
which the regime accords them . The Council of Evangelical Churches in 
the GDR wan ts to be loyal to socialism, but is constan1:ly involved in a 
s truggle for the safeguarding of its right to exerci se i ts prophetic 
ministry and to speak out independen tly on vi tal questions in the life 
of the na tion . In describing these three models, I do not want to 
suggest that there exis t only these . We should always endeavor as noted 
above, to give a nuanced view of the church -sta te relations in the 
dift:erent na tional and confessional contex ts . And by choosing these 
three models I just wish to illus tra te the variety of these 
rela tionshi ps . 
The Russian Or thodox Church 
There seem to be two apparently con tradictory tendencies in the 
policies of the Soviet government and the ruling C PSU in regard to the 
church--which we could describe with the words marginali zation and 
in tegra tion . Both these words have a special meaning and content in this 
context. Marginali zation means that the church is only allowed to move 
in a s trictly religious-li turgical sphere and not to in trude in o ther 
as pects of the life of the society. I ts task is to satisfy the religious 
needs of the fai thful . This is implied in the legislation which is very 
restric tive as far as those aspec ts of religious liberty are concerned 
which do not direc tly rela te to the celebration of the liturgy . The 
decree on separation of church and state is in terpreted in such a way 
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that the church is separated from society and that it has no right to 
have anything to do with cultural , social , or political questions or to 
display any activities in these fields . The church has become absolutely 
marginal in regard to society and a Soviet citi zen will not encounter 
the church in any province of daily life . But there are two more aspects 
which give this marginali zation a special Soviet coloration. The first 
is that the party and government see it as their task to exercise an 
anti -religious influence especially by means of education , publicity , 
press , and pro paganda . In Soviet terminology this is called enlighten­
ment to liberate the people from the influence of unscientific ideas . 
This causes a alienation of believers from society . Their own 
contribution to the life of the nation is disqualified in advance and 
there is no right of defense or reply , because this is forbidden by law 
as propaganda for the faith . 
A second aspect of marginalization is that this does not mean that 
the church may live its own life in silence in a quiet corner of 
society. The authorities exercise sharp control over the life of the 
church through their Council for Religious Affairs ; they interfere in 
the inner life of the church and they are motivated by a deep animosity 
toward the church . Interference in the life of the church was a normal 
procedure in Tsarist times , too . Those observers who accept the thesis 
that a traditional authoritarian system of government is today 
perpetuating itself in a new quasi -socialist form can find strong 
support in their favor in the attitudes of the government towards the 
church . An essential difference , or course , is the fact that the present 
government does not only want to arrange the affairs of the church , but 
th at it does with intention of putting a brake on the life of the 
church --to hinder , damage , and abolish it. 
The other tendency of Soviet policies in regard to the church could 
be called integration . They want to use the church for the building up 
of socialism . In Soviet terminology the revolutionary workers movement 
within real socialism has the task to strengthen and deepen the unity of 
action between representatives of the Marxist-Leninist world -view and 
religiously believing peo ple in the process of building socialism .
6 
Since 1 943 the Soviet regime has gradually started taking into 
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account the fact that it is n ot all that easy to destroy the chu rch ana 
that an inc reasing number of ci tizens in tend to stick to thei r 
c onvic tions. The realiza tion began to b reak th rough that it could be 
useful to make the church subservient to na tional poli tical purposes' 
as, f or ins tance, the s trengthening of the inner cohesi on of the 
socialist world, the re-establishment of Soviet influence in the Middle 
East and, since the 1950s, the S oviet peace offensive . The ROC p roved to 
be a useful and docile instrument, but the regime remained cauti ous les t 
the influence and p ositi on of the chu rch in the life of the coun try 
should inc rease in any way. (One recalls the extreme form of 
ma rginaliza ti on, an active campaign of chu rch persecu ti on du ring the 
Khrushchev period . )  The peace ac tivi ties of the chu rch as thus directed 
mainly towa rds chu rches and people ab road. 
The C ouncil for Religious Affairs has the special du ty to "help" 
the church ; that is to say, this sta te office c ontrols i ts activi ties 
and defines their content . The aim of the regime is to demons trate 
abroad that the c ommunis ts a re willing to coope rate with believe rs. 
Anti-religious actions appeared 
among tradi tionally believing 
to impede the influence of communism 
people in Muslim and Third World 
countries, so the in ten tion is now to establish the image of positive 
collabora tion of c ommunis ts and believe rs and of real reli gi ous libe rty 
unde r socialism. The adhe rence of the ROC to membership in the World 
C ouncil of Churches (WC C ) in 1 961 also was motiva ted by the gove rnmen t, 
which gave the green light for this step in a pe riod of great internal 
tensi on be tween chu rch and sta te, to play a role in the worldwide 
ecumenical movement because of the possibilities which wee membership 
offe red for the furtherance of the peace movement .  Peace is identified 
with the es tablishmen t of socialism and for the fu rthe rance of the 
policies of the socialist motherland. 
The integration of the chu rch and the believers in Soviet society 
mus t n ot be seen as a process in which they can b ring thei r own values 
and ideas about the human being and society in the building of 
socialism. I t  is ra the r  a p rocess of assimilati on in which they should 
be liberated f rom thei r antiquated, unscientific views ;  it is an 
enf orced c onformism in an ideologically synchronized society. The 
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Chris tians may par ticipa te only when they keep silent about their own 
social and ethical principles and take part in peace work whose aims and 
principles have been determined without their collaborati on or influ­
ence . 
There is an inward immigrati on and an outward c onf ormism of 
believers and the church is involved in a c onstant and bitter s truggle 
for its life . This stru ggle is not charac terized by a militant and 
ac tive confronta tion with or opposi tion against the regime, although 
militant gr oups do exis t .  The struggle of the church is rather 
characterized by a s trong c ommitment to i ts spiritual traditi ons, by 
persev erance in the fai th, and a quiet building up of the pas toral life 
of the church . These are the wespons with which the church resp onds to 
marginalization . I t  perseveres in silence under the atheistic propaganda 
and suffers humbly the in terference of the secular powers in i ts life . 
The church, and especially the ROC, realizes that its real power does 
n ot lie in official public recogniti on and an efficient organizati on of 
church life, but in the dev otion, the fideli ty, and the sacrifice of 
many millions of believers . The church cannot reach out to these people, 
but they come to it and suppor t i t .  
The ROC also has not resisted the in tegration enforced by the 
regime . It has accep ted i t, but at the same time has tried to make it 
serve its own p osi ti on in a way that is not always in accord with the 
regime ' s  intentions . The willingness to c ollabora te wi th the building of 
socialism, according to leading hierarchs, is based on the assumption 
that the party realizes in prac tice the righteousness which was preached 
by Christ .  Communism is in this way reduced to a byproduct of 
Christendom, with the fur ther implica tion that the party only practices 
what always has been preached by the church . The ideol ogical pride of a 
scientific w orld -view is wounded by such suggestions . They touch Soviet 
ideologists at a vulnerable spot . 
Collab oration with the regime is also motivated by the fervent 
pa triotism which has always been characteristic of the Russian Or thodox 
Church . I t  has always been on the side of the people and so it is now ; 
it sings in concert the praises of the Great October Revoluti on, the 
Great Patri otic War, and the achievements of social ism . The ROC stresses 
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its contribution in periods of need and of threat to the life of the 
nation. It integrates itself in a way that disturbs the ideologists. In 
Nauka i Religiia, the way in which the ROC is preparing for the 
celebration in 1 988 of the millenial anniversary of the baptism of 
Vladimir was sharply attacked; it said "one should refute the church 
legends about certain historic facts and figures and the pretensions of 
church organizations that proclaim themselves bearers of the patriotic 
principle and guardian of the spiritual heritage of the nation." 7 The 
way in which the church tries to use its enforced integration to 
reinforce its own position seems to be regarded as menacing by Soviet 
authorities. It must also be acknowledged that not all bishops accept 
the integration in the same manner. There are degrees in loyalty as even 
the Foerov report, a secret Soviet government report about the church, 
published in 1 980 in the West, clearly shows. 
Integration in the peace offensive and in propaganda abroad is also 
regarded by the church as a means of survival and strengthening its 
position. It must be acknow led ged, however, that the ROC, especially in 
this aspect of its activities, tends to put the sister churches with 
which relations are maintained in a rather awkward position and to raise 
a number of problems for the ecumenical movement which have scarcely 
been analyzed up till now. 
The Hungarian Model 
The Reformed Bishop Tibor Bartha spoke in 1968 about the 
development of a specific Hungarian model of cooperation between the 
churches and the socialist state. He alluded to the Reformed and 
Lutheran churches, which together form about a quarter of the 
population. The leadership of these churches speaks in a very positive 
way about this model. Vaguely, some allusipns are sometimes made that 
there will still exist some problems between state and church, but they 
hasten to add that these will be resolved. The situation is officially 
considered to be satisfactory and in their many international contacts 
Hungarian church representatives put this model forward as an example 
for those countries in the Third World that have opted for Marxist 
socialis m. 
The communist party in Hungary, too, sees itself as the exclusive 
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guide on the way to a be tter future. It assumes that there exis ts a 
broad consensus be tween the leading par ty, which knows the goals of 
history and determines the way to attain them, and the people. Where 
this consensus does no t seem to exis t, everything should be done to 
attain it. The secretary of the S tate office for Church Affairs, Imre 
Miklos said: 
We wan t welfare for the whole people. Our 
pro gram is known by everybody. The ma.jority 
of the workers agree with it, the popt:,lation 
agrees wi th i t. The believers also support 
our program. To cooperate does not mean to 
play the game of the communist party, as some 
would allege, but to put the program into 
ac tion. We do not want to build up society 
without the collaboration of the believers. 
Therefore our only desire is that the church 
help us. There is a program of the Patrio tic 
Front and clergymen were engaged in drawing 
it up. Atheists and believers toge ther have 
vo ted on it as the congress. . . . Therefore, 
our purpose is to realize the program. This 
is all we desire. The church must be able to 
li ve in peace and do its work. The believers 
should no t live in a constant tension. If 
they do 8 no t, people will be able to work 
be tter." 
The ideological charac ter of society is not accentuated here ; all 
emphasis is put on pragmatic coopera tion. But it goes without saying 
that the party determines the aim and conten t of the policy. "We 
declare," con tinued Miklos, "that we are a Marxist state, but that does 
no t mean that everybody who li ves in it is a Marxist." The Hungarian 
regime takes in to account that there are churches and Chris tians who are 
no adep ts of the official ideology, but that does not mean that these 
can make an independent con tribution or can take an independent stance 
in regard to government policies. Vice-premier Gyorgy Aczei said: 
"Marxism-leninism exer ts the ideological hegemony , because this is a 
scientific ideology which, according to its essence, can disclose the 
deepest problems of our time and can give the best answers to it. "
9 
The church must no t only renounce the idea of a dialogue about the 
principles of Marxism-Leninism, but cannot put forwa.rd its own social 
principles. The communist regime assumes: {1 ) that it should accept the 
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fact that Christians and churches exist, ( 2 )  that historical evolution 
leads to an evergrowing influence of the scientific (i. e. , Marxist­
Leninist) worldview and the dissolution of the "mystical veil of 
mist"--a process that the government must further, knowing however that 
the final aim of a communist society lies in a far future, and (3 ) that 
cooperation with Christians in the realization of the revolutionary aims 
of socialism is possible and useful if they are loyal and accept 
socialism as the program of the people. 
The party shows the way and wants the support of the broad masses 
of the population. Thereby the churches can play an important role and 
the party expects the collaboration of leading church people in its 
politics. The church should not take a neutral position and those who 
want to stay aside risk being regarded as a silent opposition. And one 
of the most remarkable features of a communist society is that there is 
no room for even a silent opposition. The Hungarian regime wishes a 
positive stance of the churches and does not expect any criticism from 
that side, which it would immediately qualify as opposition. The 
Hungarian Protestant church leaders, in accordance with these expec­
tations, pronounce themselves to be supporters of the socialist regime; 
they want to be "a servant church" in socialism which accepts the social 
and political program of Marxism, with the exception of its atheist 
principles. They have developed a theology of service (theology of 
diaconia) and the synod of the Hungarian Reformed Church in 1 960 
pronounced its "yes" to socialism: "We hail the socialist edification 
and we offer anew for the final realization of socialism 
our prayers. . In the forms of life of the new Hungary we discover 
th God " 1 1  d f k f . t d h . l"f ,lO e -w� e ramewor o a more JUS an appy Hungar�an � e. 
These churches have identified themselves to a large extent with the 
regime. They recognize that in principle churches have a prophetic­
critical function in society, but for them this is the case for churches 
mainly in the Christian-capitalistic countries. In socialism the 
prophetic function of the church is not a critical function; in these 
countries it means that the church should give such an orientation to 
the people of God that it is willing to cooperate in the building up of 
a new socialist society. The prophecy of the church must recognize where 
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positive forces are at work and support these . 
Lutheran Bishop Zoltan Kaldy also said: "The church, therefore, has 
put itself at the side of socialist development and has said yes to 
socialism, because she can see that this society does not only talk 
about humanism but realizes it . .. ll In that connection, it has been 
stated that "the Hungarian churches are of the opinion that the way to 
the future, according to the laws of social development, leads to a 
socialist world order . They confess that they have found their place and 
their service in that socialist social order which, according to their 
experiences, 
great world 
has more promising possibilities for the solution of the 
1 2  
problems ." The Reformed Bishop Lajos Bakos said at a 
meeting of the Patriotic Front: "Socialism means the world of freedom, 
of justice, of equality, and of humanity,"
1 3  
Not only is a critical attitude rejected, but the prophetic task of 
the church is reduced to an appeal to conformism to the new order . The 
churches regard the line which the party chose after 1956 and the way in 
which it wants to build its own Hungarian form of socialism as the only 
feasible possibility for the country and they do not expect any positive 
results from a confrontation with the regime . But the question must be 
asked whether their conception of the role of the church is not an 
impediment to exploratory action to find where the limits of the rather 
tolerant policy of the Hungarian regime with respect to cultural matters 
actually lies . Because this is its present position, the church cannot 
function as the protector of religious groups --such as the Peace Group 
for Dialogue --that wish to pursue a more critical and independent 
course . It must also be pointed out that not all ministers share the 
views of the leading bishops . Leading personages in the church can only 
be nominated under supervision of and in cooperation with the 
government, which undoubtedly has furthered their course of conformity .  
The GDR Model 
The GDR is in large majority a traditionally Protestant country . 
The Protestant churches are united in the Federation of Evangelical 
Churches in the GDR, officially founded in 1 969. The GDR churches have 
been able, in comparison with their Hungarian sister churches, to go a 
very different way . There are some very evident historical reasons for 
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this . The most important might be the fact that the "Landeskirchen " 
(people ' s -churches ) in the Soviet zone had been able to maintain their 
1 inks with the churches in West Germany . Formally until 1969, but 
actually until the building of the Berlin Wall in 1 961, GDR churches 
were full members of the Evangelical Church of Germany . This has given 
them a stronghold and support in their endeavors to find a place in the 
new regime which tried at first to apply the Soviet model of 
church -state relations and. to , confine the influence o f  the church to a 
cultic ghetto . The second reason is that in its confrontation with the 
new situation that arose as an outcome o f  the Second World War, the 
churches could profit from the experiences of the Confessing church in 
Nazi Germany and the theological heritage of the Confessing Synod o f  
Barmen in 1 9 34 . 
The Hungarian churches with their strong nationalistic traditions 
were much less prepared for the social, cultural, and political 
revolution after 1945 and did not succeed in resisting the temptation of 
a new identi fication with the powers that be . They did not have a strong 
and inspiring theological tradition, in which they could have found 
their foothold and a basic for a more independent and autonomous 
position in the new situation . I f  the situation in the GDR di ffers from 
that in Hungary, one o f  the main reasons was certainly that the GDR 
churches reacted to the new regime in a very di fferent way . When I speak 
about the GDR Model, I confine myself to the policy of the main 
Protestant churches as formulated by Synods and Bishops .  There exist o f  
course a number o f  responses t o  the situation which are quite different . 
Among church members there are those who are primarily interested in a 
spiritual migration from society and there also exists a rather vocal 
group of partisans of the present regime, especially among members of 
the CDU and the GDR . 
The attitude of the Federation o f  Evangelical Churches (Bund ) has 
been expressed in a very concise formula: We want to be a church within 
socialism, not over against socialism, not in favor of socialism, and 
not alongside socialism . They refused to follow those who called for 
assimilation, opposition, or retreat from society . They wanted to find a 
way to combine civic loyalty, social engagement, and the freedom of an 
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autonomous att itude in regard to the problems of society . The synod of 
the Bund held in E isenach ( July 2-6 , 1 9 7 1 )  expressed this as follows: 
The eight churches of the Bund regard the GDR 
as their state and take it seriously . The 
churches have made it their duty to help 
Christians to find that place in their state 
where they can fulfill their co -responsi­
bil it ies in such a manner as the w itness and 
service of the Gospel demand from them . The 
churches themselves are prepared --on their 
own or in the fellowship of the B und --to 
part ic ipate in the process of commun ication 
which the state has w ith its c itizens about 
the forms of their common future . They are 
convinced that in this d ialogue they can 
contribute something very essential to 
insight into what man and what the human 
society is and needs, because they are called 
to the w itness and service of the Gospel . A 
w itness ing and serv ing commun ity of churches . 
in the GDR w ill be obliged to give a clear 
account of its posit ion: in this thusly 
formed society, not alongs ide it, not over 
against it . It w ill have to maintain the 
freedom of · w itness and service . Because on 
the basis of its vocation it is only 
comm itted to H im who as the incar��te will of 
god came to us to save creat ion ." 
This declarat ion of intent has not put an end to the long process 
of learning in which these churches are involved . They st ill struggle 
w ith the problem in what way it is poss ible to be a w itness ing and 
serving commun ity in the corpus socialist icum . 
The communist regime from its s ide had to learn how to live and 
deal w ith a church that is not w ill ing to be changed into a collective 
chorus of assent or a one -way channel of communication from the party to 
the people . It was only after the erection of the wall in 1961 that the 
process started that led from an att itude of confrontation and reject ion 
to acceptance of the fact that one had to live as a Chr ist ian w ithin 
socialism . Gradually it became clear that the GDR was not a prov isory or 
provis ional state and that they should not cont inue to cherish the 
frustrat ing idea that to live in the GDR was a t rag ic fate . The 
challenge to live in this situat ion had to be accepted and the catchword 
of the Bund became: loyalty but then crit ical loyalty, cooperation but 
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then c ritical coope ra tion . "We have not become a s ilent chu rch," said 
one of the bishops . "When we speak, however, we do not wan t 
confrontation--we do not use aggress ive, polem ical and o ffend ing tones . 
. We do no t look fo r confl ic t, but neithe r do we evade it at all 
15 costs . "  
In princ iple the communist reg ime does not appreciate it when the 
church keeps itself a c ritical d istance . I t  wan ts the chu rch to become a 
pa rtisan o f  the social is t orde r .  The church is not asked to abandon its 
faith and confess ion, but it should choose for what is good--socialism, 
and re jec t wha t  is bad --capital ism . Ch ristians may have their prope r 
motiva tion, the ir "e igen motivie rte Parte inahme," as the sec retary of 
the S ta te Off ice fo r Chu rch Affa i rs declared in 1982: 
We assume that the sepa ra tion and inde­
pendence of the churches of our Republ ic in 
respect to the churches of the Federal 
Republ ic and separation of chu rch and 
state--which means the non in terfe rence of the 
state in the internal affa irs of the chu rch 
and the noninterference of the chu rches in 
the affa i rs of the state--a re as much in the 
interest o f  us all and ce rta inly in the 
well -unde rstood sel f-interest of the chu rches 
when they take s ides w i th peace, d isarmamen t, 
and
. 
de�ente16 on the basis of their own motJ.vatJ.ons . 
This really means that the church should res trict itsel f to purely 
rel igious matte rs and should not deal w i th soc ial questions that are 
exclus ively the domain o f  the party . I t  is, however asked to support the 
policies o f  the pa rty on the bas is of its own motivations . 
We constantly meet with this sort o f  reason ing when the Marxis ts in 
the pos t-revolutionary s i tua tion of East European coun tries speak about 
cooperation w ith Chris tians in the bu ild ing o f  a soc ial is t society and 
about the realization o f  "true humanism ." Ch ristians may have their own 
motivations to join in this process, but they a re not expec ted to bring 
in anything o f  the ir own as far as the content of the cooperation is 
concerned . Befo re starting the d ialogue and the cooperation they have to 
leave all the ir own ideas and princ iples in the cloak room . And it is 
precisely that tha t  the GDR churches do not want .  They do no t w ish to 
identify, even out o f  their own Ch ris tian mo tives, w ith the existing 
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society and ha il the policy o f  the rul ing party as the only poss ible an� 
only right way for the future . 
B ishop A .  Schonherr expressed as his convic tion that to be a church 
within socialism meant full-fled ged par tic ipation in society while 
re taining its full autonom y and its proper profile . 1 7  This attitude is 
qu ite different from that o f  the Hungarian B ishop T ibor Bartha , who 
sa id : " For Christians who stand in the im itation of Christ the build ing 
of human soc ial cond itions is a ca tegorical moral imperative , thou gh on 
h b . f d ' ff . . . d . . u 1 8  d t e as1s o a 1 erent 1nsp 1rat1on an mot1vat1on . He oes not wan t 
to hear about a critical d istance in respect to the regime , but 
considers this historical per iod , in which the government w ishes to 
serve the interest of the people by un iting all creative forces as an 
ac t of Div ine Prov idence . Cr i tical loyal ty has here been exchanged for 
conformism , as des ired by the party . Here it has been accep ted that 
Chr istians only have their own particular motives to cooperate , but that 
they are not real partners w i th their own principles and ins igh ts about 
the human being and society . 
The churches in the GDR have chosen the narrow path by re jec ting on 
the one s ide a full identification w ith party �ims and me thods , but by 
refus ing at the same time to play the role o f  an oppos ition party . A 
very del ica te position , because pol itical oppos ition is not tolera ted 
and the subtleties o f  the d ifference between critical Chr is tian w itness 
and pol itical opposition are not always very clear , not even for 
Christian groups in other parts o f  the world , let alone for communist 
gover nmen ts . The churches do not want to be regarded as politically 
diss ident movements but rather as churches with their own specific task 
in soc iety . They decline to form on the bas is of the Chris tian faith a 
sort of an ti-ideology w ith a compe titive vision of the order ing of 
society . But they also refuse to cons ider the ruling ideology as a 
doc trine of salvation which would have the right to mould the 
consciousness of the people and they reject the pretens ion that this 
ideology contains ultimate answers to the deepest problems of human 
be ings and society . The Gospel l iberates the human being and enables him 
or her to see the ideology in its lim i t ed  sign i ficance and to continue 
to ask critical questions about how far it serves in theory and practice 
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in human life . If , however , the Marxis t-Leninist ideology becomes 
absolute and a closed world -view , then a conflict is inevitable . In an 
ar ticle titled "Salva tion T oday ," Bishop Krusche wro t.e: "The fai th tha t 
in Chris t alone is salva tion is a critical correction of all actual 
idolatry , of all endeavors to give a messianic con tent to an Emgagement 
for the people (and ) to qualify humanistic progr ams and ideas as 
doc trines of salva tion . " 1 9  
T o  a certain extent this self -definition of the churches in regard 
to their posi tion in a communist society has been officially accep ted . 
The meeting of the representatives of the Bund with E .  Honecker on March 
6, 1 9 78 , seems to have resul ted in a prudent acceptance of this kind of 
role of the church in society . Problems were to be sol ved in a spirit of 
tolerance and mutual understanding . The protocol of this meeting has 
been described subsequently as a documen t "von konkorda ts ahnlichem 
20 Charak ter" (in o ther words , a quasi-concorda t )  . Th e tens ion s between 
church and s ta te have not disappeared since then and they are inevitable 
be tween a state which has definite ideological concep tions about the 
place of the church in society and a church which is not willing to let 
itself be locked up in a cultic ghetto or to function as decora tion of 
the facade of socialism . The church , as a room for freedom and 
fellowship , presen ts i tself as a societas alia , a societas alternativa , 
and a societas contraria . 2 1  The tensions that this involves are an 
essen tial as pect of the s truggle for libera tion which the GDR churches 
carry on . They are in a real spiri tual sense a libera tion-movemen t ,  
because they resist submission to human concep ts of salvation and refuse 
to accep t the totalitarian pre tensions of the regime . 
Relevance for the Ecumenical Movement 
T o  conclude , I would like to make some remarks about the 
ecumenical collabora tion of churches in Eas tern Europe . Let me s tart 
with the views of an unknown East European theologian whose remarks were 
published in a World Council of Churches ' s tudy , which is one of the few 
cri tical publications on the situation of the churches in Eas tern Europe 
. b h . 22 to be 1 Ssued y t e WCC . He wr 1 tes: 
Ecumenism in Eastern Europe is still 
fragile and inarticulate , because the ecu ­
menical profile of the region is not clear , 
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the re is little oppo rtunity to "pra cti ce" 
regional ecumenism , and the fu ll ecclesi­
astical dive rsity of Easte rn European 
churches is not represented in their dialogue 
with one another: for example , the Roman 
Catho lic Church , the chu rch of the majority 
in many Easte rn European count ries , is not a 
pa rtner in the discussions . Moreover , the 
autonomy of the regional chu rch bodies cannot 
be safegua rded against the va rious po liti ca l  
measures . I n  any case , the churches must be 
su re that ecumenisrn is not a t rap set by the 
state to encou rage them to neg lect their 
internal , local rnissi�2 fo r the sake of 
international contacts . 
These last two points a re very impo rtant . The possibili lty of a f ree an­
autonomous organization is not possible and the state t ries to use 
e cumenical church bodies for its own pu rposes . 
It is remarkable , but after what has been said not surprising , that 
the P rotestant churches of Hungary play a predominant role in the 
organization of a so rt of COMECON-e cumene . The Reformed Bisho p  Karoly 
Toth su cceeded Metropolitan Nikodirn as president of the Christian Peace 
Confe rence (Prague ) and since then the activities of this pea ce movement 
in the Third Wo rld have in creased conside rab ly . The Lutheran Bishop 
K aldy , one of the wel l  known chu rch diplomats , said in the report to his 
synod ( Feb . 1 98 1 ) 23 that in a pe riod of four yea rs he pa rticipated in 
1 60 confe rences and meetings abroad "to make known our views and to 
st rengthen interchu rch relations ; he received at horne 80 delegations 
f rom abroad . In a meeting of the National Pea ce Congress in 1 973, he 
explained: "We support the foreign po li cy of our socialist state and we 
devote our international contacts to the fu rthe rance of the peace 
endeavors . . our prima ry pea ce wo rk is our stand fo r socialism , our 
faithfu lness to it , and the fortifying of this faithfu lness . For us 
peace and so cialism are indissolubly interrelated ."
24 His 
col league , Bishop E Ottlyk , observed that "ou r  chu rches raise their 
voi ce in the fo rums of world Christianity . � This is a sign of the 
aspiration that the Ch ristians of the wo rld become a worldwide camp for 
the furtherance of peace and the friendship of 
25 
people . "  In the 
Hunga rian pa rliament , of whi ch he is a rnernbe r ,  Kaldy remarked in 1 976 
that the ex cellent relations between church and state in Hungary bear 
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f ru it and a re a stimulant for those count ries in Af rica which ha ve 
chosen the social ist orde r .  "We like to inform the churches in these 
count ries about our expe rience and we exho rt them to accept the new 
soc ial orde r  and se rve positively in it . " 26 In his repo rt of 1 979 , he 
spoke about the new relat ions w ith the Lutheran Chu rd:. in Ethiop ia: "Our 
aim was to encou rage the church which lives in a new revolut ionary 
s ituat ion and to strengthen its ins ight that the bu ild ing up of a 
27 socialist social o rde r does not impede the se rvice of the chu rch . "  
At a meet ing o f  the All -Af rican Confe rence o f  Chu rches , Bishop 
T oth , as leade r of a CPC delegat ion , stated that the CPC is always 
w ill ing to help the churches and chu rch o rganizations to get mo re easy 
access to the soc ial ist countries , 28 and Hunga rian P rofesso r :E: .  Kocsis 
wrote in a CPC publication that the soc ialist countries have become 
29 model s of the development of the Third Worl d . He added: "The churches 
and Ch rist ians of the East Eu ropean count ries ha ve on the bas is of the 
human aims of the new society dec ided positi vely for socialism ." These 
lead ing vo ices continually emphasize that devotion to peace is p receded 
by a cho ice fo r the existing Marx ist soc ial ist orde r .  Peace wo rk in this 
sense is an aspect of the ideological and political conf rontation . 
Nowhere else do we f ind this so clearly expres sed as by these 
Hunga rians . 
It should not surp rise us that it was the Hunga rian B ishop T .  
Ba rtha ,  together w ith the Lutheran Gene ral-Bishop Jan M ichalko f rom 
Slo vak ia , who took the inti t iat ive to approach the Moscow Pat riarchate 
w ith the request to o rganize a conference of wee member chu rch es f rom 
socialist countries in 1 97 4 ,  w ith the aim "to come to a common policy 
and an intensif ication of their cont ribution to Christian un ity , peace , 
30 and collaboration of peoples ." Th is was the starting point for a 
numbe r  of such conferences held s ince . It would be inte re st ing to 
analyze these meet ings but only supe rf icial statements are issued about 
them and the reports a re not made ava ilable . It is very likely that the 
GDR churches , which of course have many contacts w ith siste r  chu rches in 
Easte rn Europe , but wh ich we re rather unhappy w ith this init iat ive , have 
made it clea r that they only w ished to participate if the meet ings were 
convened by the wee itself . (This was done f rom 1 9 77 onwards . )  They have 
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a great reluctance to be inse rted into a bloc of Ea st Eu ropean member 
churches . Although t hey have to operate ve ry prudently, one of t heir 
representatives expres sed thi s  very clea rly by stating: "Although our 
co ntacts with the e stablished Marxist-Lenini st socialism have provided 
us with a number of common expe riences, t hey have certainly not marked 
us in such a way that our churche s (i .e . the chu rche s in Eastern 
Europe--autho r ' s  rema rk )  have developed a specific common line of 
3 1  conduct . "  
Not everyone wa s ve ry e nthusiastic and the secreta ry of the Poli sh 
Ecumenical Council asked how t he chu rches could b ring t he real p roblems 
of their count rie s to the fo re and whether they have the nece ssary 
32 f reedom to do so . The feeling did certainly exist that thi s  wa s one of 
t ho se initiative s  which o ne has to accept --Who could refu se to attend a 
regional meeting of wee member churche s?--but the aim of which really 
was to b ring about t he formation of a bloc of Ea st European chu rches 
that could have a defi nite influence on the social and political work of 
t he WCC . At the last meeting of June 1 982 in preparation for . the 
Vancouver Assembly, it wa s said that the churche s f rom sociali st 
count rie s should have a greater share in the life and activitie s as well 
a s  in the leade rship of the wee . 
33 
T heir contribution could be, and I 
quote f rom t he exce rpt of a repo rt published in Ecumenical P ress 
Service : 
a )  Experience of the churches in sociali st 
count rie s  can be of some u se a nd benefit to 
Chri stians in the Third Wo rld whe re society 
is in a proce ss of rapid social and ideo­
logical change in the direction of sociali st 
o rde r ;  b )  Chri stian re sponse to t he model of 
sociali st society ; c )  The area of peace, 
disarmament, etc . Chu rches in sociali st 
count rie s have a lot to say and do in thi s  
regard . They already have wide experience and 
fi ne achievement s in the}.f st ruggle to save 
the sacred gift of life . "  
The remark made in t he wee Faith and Order publication quoted above 
seem s to have been fo rgotten: "The autonomy of regional church bodies 
(in Easte rn Europe ) cannot be safeguarded against the various political 
pre s sure s . " They are unde r pre ssure to become vehicle s of ideological 
a nd nationali stic propaganda and to defend the interests of their home 
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st ates . It does not seem wise fo r the wee to encourage this development 
in the direction of a bloc of chu rches f rom socialist countries, nor to 
express in Vancouve r (Policy Ref . Co . I )  the wish that these meetings be 
continued bec ause they are an impo rtant ecumenic al development . Are they 
not, on the cont rary, a trap set by the st ate? 
The action of the chu rches f rom East Eu rope an coun t ri es in the 
intern ational field are rather vigo rous and, generally spe aking fully in 
line with the politic al views of the Warsaw Pact countri E!S . Their 
motiv ations are diffe rent: the Orthodo x chu rches participate in peace 
wo rk out of a n ational-pat riotic b ackg round, Hung arian s often seem to be 
inspired by their political stance in favor of soci aJ ism, others do it 
on the b asis of pu rely pragm atic conside ration- -they simply h ave to do 
it and are too weak to resist the pressure under which they live . All of 
them have at the same time their purely chu rchly re asons: they need the 
cont act and the spiritual fellowship of their sister churches in the 
West a rid they hope th at their position in their own country might be 
st rengthened by thei r service to national political aims, an expectation 
which unfo rtunately is sc arcely realized in practice .  The b isho ps of 
most Reman C atholic churches have been able in the main to adopt an 
aloof stance tow ards participation in the communist peace actions . 
In my opinion the pe ace wo rk of the churches of Eastern Europe is 
used by the state autho rities for their own pu rposes . How far this 
testifies to a new and re al social and politic al ·�ngagement of the 
churches c annot be e asily defined . The actions fo.r peace of these 
churches are not me rely an expression of a new self -consciousne ss of the 
believe rs, but at the same time instruments of ideo logic al propagand a  
and m anipulation o f  the goodwill of the peo ple . Russian church 
representatives when ab road, for example, h ave to ·take into account 
legislation about sl ande ring and disc rediting the soci al system --a 
rathe r v ague article which m akes it a d ange rous t:r.ing to utter any 
critical statements about the policies of their own count ry . Th ere is no 
possibility for a f ree discussion of social and polit ic al issues in the 
pa rishes (except in the GDR and Pol and and they h ave no independent 
sources of inform ation or study grou ps . Usually st atements and 
declarations of church bodies are not diffe rent f rom t.hose of state and 
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party . Their b ibl ical and th eolog ical mot ivat ions seem to have an 
ornam ental function . Ev en a th eolog ical work ing-group of th e Ass emby of 
th e Christian P each conference in Prague in 1 978 r emarked that the 
th eological motivations in th e CPC ar e rather isolat ed from its 
pol itical prax is . In the words of Max Stackhouse in the Christian 
C entury (198 3, p .  584 )  ar e th e peace efforts of th e Russ ian Orthodox 
Church "s imply an extension of the party l ine in sacred phrases ?" This 
do es not mean that a r eal longing for peace do es not exist in th e 
Russ ian church es, but the government has not, just like our own 
gov ernm ents, any need of div erg ing opinions about the way to attain 
peac e .  Contrary to our s ituation, however, the government of the Sov iet 
Union us es all possib il it ies to suppr ess dev iating id eas . 
This capt iv ity of th e church es makes it difficult to come to close 
cooperation and to common ecum enical declarations about socio-polit ical 
questions . In a consultation of the Conf erence of European Church es 
(CED ) in which church es from th e East ern and West ern parts of Europe 
collaborat e, a Swiss th eologian (H . Ruh, 1978 ) said : 
The church es have to devote themselv es to the 
work for peace in th eir own sph er e of 
influenc e .  They can not giv e  a contribution 
to peace in th e world by way of appeals 
across the border, but by way of changes in 
th eir own soc iety . We must prom is e each oth er 
to do all we can in our own countr i es . 
Western churches ar e not serv ed by appeals 
for d isarmam ent from church es in East ern 
Europe and these church es do not want such 
appeals from the West . . Unfortunately 
th e church es ar e often mor e w illing to 
support changes in oth er soc iet i es . 
Therefore th ey must b e  urged to take ini ti­
ativ es in th eir own countries in the interest 
of disarmam ent and peace .  
D r .  Ruh asked the church es from Eastern Europe to tak e a more critical 
att itude in th eir own countr i es .  Church actions in th e West would be 
more effective if our church es could say • "Look at what our count erparts 
in the East ar e doing--they ar e also engaged in r eal work for peace and 
not just support ing party propaganda ." 
But unfortunately the situat ion is still such that most churches up 
t ill now, have not b e en able to atta in an ind ependent pos ition in regard 
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to the sta te .  One of the few exceptions is the Council of Evangelical 
Chur ches in the GDR . The GDR churches have succeeded in keeping their 
internal autonomy and their a ctions for pea ce and pea ce educa tion are 
cri ti cal also in regard to their own na tional politi cs . An Evangeli cal 
bishop of the GDR has, in a spee ch to a conferen ce of the CEC, made a 
famous remark: "Only those who fulfill their social duty in their own 
area , have the right to speak about what happens in the area o f  o thers . 
The chur ches can only serve pea ce if they not simply serve their own 
na tional interes ts and behave as ampli fiers o f  the foreign policy of 
their own governments . If they only fulfill this role o f  amplifier, they 
lose their function as pea cemakers . Chur ches which do not ask critical 
ques tions about the poli cy o f  their own government, but who declare this 
poli cy exclusively as peace policy are not the salt of the ear th but the 
marmalade o f  their na tion ." 35 
I think this statement is extremely impor tant, but it is 
unfor tuna tely too easily forgotten . Most churches in Eastern Europe do 
no t have the possibility to have an independent stance in regard to 
par ty poli cy and their pea ce work is outward directed . It is thus 
extremely di fficult to come to common actions and declaration by these 
chur ches and the ch ur ches in the West, which usually approach the 
poli ti cs of their national governments in a very critical way . 
Salt and marmalade are not a pleasant mixture . Actions and 
de clarations toge ther with the chur ches of the communist countries (and 
again wi th some exceptions for the GDR ) may even have a nega tive e ffect 
be cause they can raise the suspi cion of being propagandisti c  and to be 
meant to undermine the position of one of the par ties . 
It is undo ub tedly our task to maintain ecumenical rela tions with 
the- chur ches in Eas tern Europe b ut those who maintain these rela tions 
sho uld be well informed about the real si tua tion and no t fall vi ctim to 
ulterior propaganda intentions . 
- 35 -
J .  A .  Hebly 
Utrecht 
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